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Abstract In this work I present a detailed critique of the
dignity-related arguments that have been advanced against
the creation of human–nonhuman chimeras that could
possess human-like mental capacities. My main claim is
that the arguments so far advanced are incapable of
grounding a principled objection against the creation of
such creatures. I conclude that these arguments have one,
or more, of the following problems: (a) they confuse the
ethical assessment of the creation of chimeras with the
ethical assessment of how such creatures would be treated
in specific contexts (e.g. in the laboratory), (b) they mis-
represent how a being could be treated solely as means
towards others’ ends, (c) they fall short of demonstrating
how humanity’s dignity would be violated by the creation
of such entities, and (d) they fail to properly characterise
the moral responsibilities that moral agents have towards
other moral agents and sentient beings.
Keywords Chimeras  Human–nonhuman chimeras 
Human dignity  Dignity  Nonhuman animals  Part-human
Introduction
In this paper I present and critically examine the dignity-
related arguments that have been advanced against the
creation of human–nonhuman chimeras that could possess
human-like mental capacities. The paper is divided into
three main sections. In this first section I present a brief
account of what chimeras are and what role they play in
biological sciences research. In the second section I ex-
amine, and show the pitfalls of, the human dignity defini-
tions that for the most part have been used when arguing
against the creation of such chimeras. In the third section I
investigate the dignity-related arguments advanced by
Karpowicz et al. (2004, 2005), Johnston and Eliot (2003),
de Melo-Martı´n (2008), and MacKellar and Jones (2012)
and show why they are found wanting.
While Karpowicz et al.’s arguments have been exam-
ined before,1 this paper adds to the current discussion on
the ethics of creating human–nonhuman chimeras in sev-
eral new ways. First, I present new counterarguments
against Karpowicz et al.’s position. Second, I explore, for
the first time, the arguments advanced by Johnston and
Eliot, de Melo-Martı´n, and Mackellar and Jones. Finally, I
show that from a species neutral perspective the dignity-
related arguments that have been advanced against the
creation of chimeras with human-like mental capacities do
not only apply to the creation of human–nonhuman chi-
meras that are preponderantly nonhuman, but also apply to
human–human chimeras, and to human–nonhuman chi-
meras that are predominantly human.
The mythological chimera
We owe the canonical characterisation of the mythological
Chimera to the Ancient Greek epic poet Homer. In the
sixth book of the Iliad (179–181) Homer narrates how
Glaucus, captain in the Lycian army, is going to face the& Ce´sar Palacios-Gonza´lez
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Greek hero Diomed in single combat. Prior to their fight,
Diomed asks who is he to face for fear that his opponent
might be a god. Glaucus responds by telling the story of his
lineage, and reveals that he is the grandson of Bellerophon,
who by command of King Iobates killed Chimera. It is in
these lines of the Iliad that Homer depicts this mythological
creature:
First, dire Chimaera’s conquest was enjoin’d;
A mingled monster of no mortal kind!
Behind, a dragon’s fiery tail was spread;
A goat’s rough body bore a lion’s head;
Her pitchy nostrils flaky flames expire;
Her gaping throat emits infernal fire. (Homer 1836)
Homer’s characterisation is not the only one to be found
in Ancient Greek mythology. In the Theogony (319–325),
Hesiod describes Chimera not as a one-headed being with
the body parts of three different animals, but as a creature
composed of the heads and body parts of three different
animals:
She [Echidna] was the mother of Chimaera who
breathed raging fire, a creature fearful, great, swift
footed and strong, who had three heads, one of a
grim-eyed lion, another of a goat, and another of a
snake, a fierce dragon; in her forepart she was a lion;
in her hinder part, a dragon; and in her middle, a goat,
breathing forth a fearful blast of blazing fire. (Hesiod
1914)
In the broader mythological context the term chimera has
come to mean any entity that is constituted of different
parts of different kinds of animals. For example, sirens,
harpies, centaurs and the Minotaur are considered to be
chimeric entities (Anijar and Brem 2003). Chimeras, in this
wider sense, are depicted in Ancient Greek mythology both
as dangerous creatures—like the sirens, who succeeded at
shipwrecking sailors, and the Minotaur, who devoured
those sent into his labyrinth—and as noble creatures—like
the centaur Chiron, who trained Heracles.
Non-mythological chimeras
In the second half of the twentieth century, interspecific
chimeras ‘escaped’ the bounds of mythology and literary
studies to become intentionally created and studied in life
sciences faculties around the world.2 Chimeras, contrary to
transgenic animals, are not created by the insertion of one,
or multiple, exogenous genes. They are beings formed by
combining the whole cells of genetically different organ-
isms into a single organism.3 The UK Academy of Medical
Sciences provides this definition, which I will endorse
throughout the paper:
Chimæras are formed by mixing together whole cells
originating from different organisms. The new or-
ganism that results is made up of a ‘‘patchwork’’ of
cells from the two different sources. Each cell of a
chimæra contains genes from only one of the or-
ganisms from which it is made. (…) Primary chi-
mæras are formed by mixing together two early
embryos, or an early embryo with isolated embryonic
cell types obtained from a different embryo or cul-
tured stem cell line. The resulting chimæra has cells
of different origins, in many tissues. Secondary chi-
mæras are formed experimentally by transplanting (or
grafting) cells or tissues into animals at later stages of
development, including late fetal stages, post-natal or
even adult animals. The donor cells are only present
in a few tissues. (The Academy of Medical Sciences
2011, 18–19)
Two of the first chimeras to be intentionally created
were a goat-sheep chimera and a quail-chick chimera
(Fehilly et al. 1984; Le Douarin et al. 1974; Balaban et al.
1988). Contrary to these intentionally created chimeras
they can also occur naturally, for example when two non-
monozygotic early human embryos fuse inside the womb
(Tippett 1983; Norton and Zehner 2008).
Intentionally created chimeras can be intraspecific—
when the cells that create such creatures originate within
organisms (or cultured stem cell lines) that belong to the
same biological species—or they can be interspecific—
when the cells that create such beings originate within
organisms (or cultured stem cell lines) that belong to dif-
ferent biological species (Xiang et al. 2008). It is worth
noting, as the definition of the Academy of Medical Sci-
ences points out, that the production of chimeras is affected
by the number of engrafted cells, the origin of those cells,
and by the time of the mixing. This means that alterations
in these variables would produce different outcomes in
respect of the kinds of beings produced. Having this in
mind should guard us against what John Harris calls the
‘mermaid myth’: the idea that if we create a chimeric entity
the resulting creature would necessarily possess easily
recognizable phenotypic features from all ‘progenitors’
(Harris 2011).
Along with chimeras and transgenic animals there is
another type of being that can be created both naturally and
through biotechnology: hybrids. Hybrids are the offspring
2 It is worth mentioning that although contemporary chimeras are
tamer than those depicted by the Ancient Greeks we cannot discard
the possibility that someone could find a way to weaponise a chimeric
being. (Scott 2006; Savulescu 2013).
3 For a discussion about the possible chimeric entities that could exist
see Greely’s (2003) Defining Chimeras… and Chimeric Concerns.
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of organisms that belong to different biological species. For
example, a mule is a hybrid produced by a female horse
and a male donkey. Humans can ‘produce’ hybrids in two
ways: through artificial reproductive techniques (artificial
insemination or in vitro fertilization) or by setting the
conditions so a fertile male and female of different biolo-
gical species mate. The viability of the hybrids, in both
cases, will depend on biological factors.
Human–nonhuman chimeras
Chimeras, primary and secondary, can be produced with
human components. In biological sciences human–nonhu-
man chimeras (henceforth HNH-chimeras) have been used
in research into human haematopoiesis, the development
and function of the immune system, infectious diseases,
autoimmunity, cancer, and regenerative medicine (Shultz
et al. 2007). They have also been used as research tools for
the creation of vaccines against deadly diseases such as
malaria, dengue, Hepatitis B, HIV and Hepatitis C (Davis
and Stanley 2003; Sacci Jr et al. 2006; Yauch and Shresta
2008; Legrand et al. 2009; Bhan et al. 2010); and have been
employed for the study of human cell development,
maturation and migration (Sun et al. 2007; Tam and Ros-
sant 2003; Lapidot 2001).
The creation and use of most contemporary human-de-
veloped HNH-chimeras has not been seen to present new
ethical concerns, other than those related to the destruction
of human embryos, animal ethics and research ethics. In
part, this has been the case because such entities have been
predominantly constituted by nonhuman components.
Nonetheless, the possibility of creating HNH-chimeras
with brains composed largely of human brain cells has
raised ethical concerns about the morality of such ex-
periments (Greely et al. 2007). The main question is if it is
morally permissible to create HNH-chimeras that would
possess the capacities that are generally associated with
‘human’ dignity or personhood.4 For example, is it morally
permissible to engraft sufficient human stem cells, or
neural stem cells, into a great ape embryo so it develops
normal human-like cognitive capacities?
In response to the possibility of creating HNH-chimeras
with dignity, or personhood, related capacities, several
authors have advanced dignity-related arguments in order
to prove that doing so would be immoral and should not be
done. Now, before examining such arguments (see
Sect. ‘Dignity and HNH-chimeras with human-like mental
capacities’) I will commence by emphasising a well-known
problem with dignity-related stances: that there is no con-
sensus about what dignity means (the term has even been
regarded as a useless concept; Schroeder 2010; Macklin
2003). Having this in mind, in the next section I will not try
to provide a final account of dignity, but I will critically
examine the definitions that Karpowicz et al. (2004, 2005)
have proposed.
‘Human’ dignity
Karpowicz et al. have argued that even when the creation
of certain types of HNH-chimera is morally unproblematic,
human dignity would be denied, undermined or denigrated
by the creation of HNH-chimeras that possess human-like
functional and emergent psychological capacities5,6 (Kar-
powicz et al. 2004, 2005). Let’s examine what they un-
derstand by human dignity.
In their 2004 paper Karpowicz et al. defined human
dignity as a ‘‘widely shared concept that refers to being
worthy or respected because one is human’’ (Karpowicz
et al. 2004, 333). According to this definition, humans’
moral value is grounded on their belonging to the Homo
sapiens species (according to the common understanding of
what ‘human’ means). Thus, any being that belongs to this
biological species would possess human dignity, and any
being that does not belong to it would not possess human
dignity.
Karpowicz et al. go on to clarify that ‘‘Human dignity is
based on the recognition that human beings possess, will
possess, or have possessed functional and emergent psy-
chological capacities that indicate they are worthy of re-
spect’’ (Karpowicz et al. 2004, 333). We can assert that
Karpowicz et al.’s definition of human dignity entails the
following elements:
(1) Human dignity refers to being worthy or respected
because one is human.
(2) Human dignity is based on the recognition that
humans possess, will possess or have possessed
4 Throughout the paper I will use the term ‘person’ to refer to beings
that possess dignity conferring psychological capacities.
5 Unless specified otherwise when I talk about functional and
emergent psychological capacities I am talking about statistically
normal human-like functional and emergent psychological capacities.
6 Eberl and Ballard (2008, 45) have correctly asserted that it is
largely unknown if the engraftment of undifferentiated pluripotent
human stem cells into a nonhuman animal embryo could lead to the
development of a functioning cerebrum supportive of self-conscious
rational thought. Although, as Alter (2007) states, to imagine an ape-
human viable hybrid or any other chimera that contains the best
features of each may be to imagine science fiction I will proceed in
this paper assuming that this might be possible. One case that partially
supports this idea is the creation of mouse-human chimeras where
their long-term potentiation ‘‘was sharply enhanced (…), as was their
learning, as assessed by Barnes maze navigation, object-location
memory, and both contextual and tone fear conditioning.’’ (Han et al.
2013, 342).
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functional and emergent psychological capacities
that indicate they are worthy of respect.
There are two things that must be noted about this
definition. First, that it does not explicitly state the sort of
moral status beings with dignity possess. Let’s remember
that to state that an entity possesses moral status is to re-
alise that ‘‘in its own right and for its own sake, it can give
us reason to do things such as not destroy it or help it’’
(Kamm 2007, 229). Even so, the authors implicitly assume,
as it will become clear, that to possess dignity is to have a
unique moral value.
Second, there is a tension between their two clauses.
The source of this tension is that 1 is far more extensive
than 2. For 1, being human is a necessary and sufficient
condition for possessing human dignity, while for 2 being
human is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for
possessing human dignity. While it is embedded in both
clauses that being human is a necessary condition for
possessing dignity, the sufficiency requirements are dif-
ferent in each case.
Why is this important? It is so because on the one hand,
on 1, every human being—from the moment of conception
to the moment of death—possesses human dignity. For
example, an anencephalic child possesses human dignity.
While, on the other hand, on 2, there are some human
beings that do not fulfil the conditions for possessing hu-
man dignity. Human beings that do not possess, will not
possess and have never possessed functional and emergent
psychological capacities cannot be recognized as possess-
ing human dignity. For example, a child with genetically
caused anencephalia. The question that Karpowicz et al.
have to answer is how anencephalic child type cases fit into
their account of human dignity without being inconsistent
with a definition that includes both 1 and 2.
Baylis and Fenton think that the only way Karpowicz
et al. can make their human dignity definition work is by
endorsing the idea that belonging to a class that contains
members that possess certain cognitive or emotional ca-
pacities (thus effectively renouncing to 2) is what grants
such moral worth:
At the same time, both of these points in tension
[what I have called 1 and 2] rely on an implicit appeal
to a principle conferring intrinsic moral value on x if
x belongs to a class A that contains members who
manifest certain cognitive or emotional capacities,
even if x herself does not. X is thus valued, or pos-
sesses moral significance, because x is a member of
class A. In this case, the class is all humans. (Baylis
and Fenton 2007, 201)
If this is the case then a better way of expressing Kar-
powicz et al.’s human dignity definition would be:
(1) Human dignity refers to being worthy or respected
because one is human.
(20) Human dignity is based on the recognition of being
worthy or respected because one belongs to the
Homo sapiens species, which is characterised by
the fact that normally humans possess, will possess
or have possessed functional and emergent psy-
chological capacities.
There are at least two problems with this ‘new’ approach
to human dignity. The first is that even when it clearly
explains who possesses human dignity it does not explain
why belonging to such a class (i.e. the Homo sapiens
species) confers such moral worth—this objection has been
long noted in animal ethics literature. It is simply stated,
but not explained, that any member of the class humans has
dignity. Now, if they maintain that species belonging is
what confers such unique value then this definition is
speciesist. Speciesism, in this case anthropocentrism,
asserts that our human biological commonality confers us
superior moral worth than those who are not members of
our species (Singer 2009). Just as with racism and sexism,
speciesism extracts a normative conclusion (humans have
more moral worth than all other creatures) from an arbi-
trarily chosen morally insignificant fact. To be a member of
the Homo sapiens species ‘‘is simply a matter of biology: It
is to be an organism that has descended from a particular
branch of the tree of terrestrial life, an organism whose
genome lies somewhere within a particular range, or the
like’’ (DeGrazia 2007, 312). Finally, species belonging
appears not to be what confers dignity. For example, if we
were to find extraterrestrial life forms with mental ca-
pacities like ours we would most certainly accept that they
possess dignity. For example, if in real life we found a
Vulcan alien—Spock—we would accept that killing him is
tantamount to killing a human person.
The second problem that arises from this account is that
if we concede that being human (i.e. belonging to the
Homo sapiens species) is a necessary condition for pos-
sessing human dignity, then using such a definition to
construct a general argument against the creation of HNH-
chimeras with human-like mental capacities becomes
deeply problematic. Why? Because certain HNH-chimeras
with human-like mental capacities cannot be categorised as
being human, and therefore they would not fulfil a neces-
sary condition for possessing dignity: belonging to the
Homo sapiens species. For example, a human-chimp chi-
mera that is completely chimpanzee except for its human
brain would certainly not classify as belonging to the Homo
sapiens species. If we accept this, then we also have to
accept that human dignity arguments cannot be raised
against the creation of HNH-chimeras with human-like
mental capacities in all cases. Therefore, even if
490 C. P. Gonza´lez
123
Karpowicz et al.’s arguments were correct, the creation of
certain HNH-chimeras with human-like mental capacities
would not violate human dignity. Resnik (2003, 35) has
made a similar point when commenting on the possibility
of patenting a human embryo with chimpanzee genes: ‘‘I
argued that it would threaten but not violate human dignity
because the humanzee would not be a human being’’.
One could challenge the previous point by arguing that
HNH-chimeras belong to the Homo sapiens species by
virtue of the engrafted cells, and thus have human dignity.
A problem with this strategy is that those defending it
would have to provide a reasonable explanation for how
this happens and where the limits lie (i.e. how and under
what circumstances the engraftment of X number cells
‘makes’ a nonhuman animal belong to the Homo sapiens
species).7 They would also have to explain whether ‘spe-
cies transition’ is bidirectional, or not, in cases concerning
human beings (i.e. if we engraft X amount of nonhuman-
animal cells into a human would such a human ‘become’
part of that nonhuman animal species). As Streiffer (2005,
357) asks, ‘‘when faced with an organism that has some
human cells and some nonhuman cells, how is one to de-
cide whether the organism is human, and hence, whether it
is a human being?’’.
The tension between clauses 1 and 2 can be solved by
appealing to an anthropocentric principle (i.e. reformulat-
ing 2 into 20). However, the cost of maintaining such a
definition of human dignity is that we are stuck with a
speciesist account that cannot support a general dignity-
based argument against the creation of HNH-chimeras with
human-like mental capacities. This being the case, we need
to look for an alternative human dignity account if we want
to advance a general argument against the creation of such
creatures.
A psychological capacities account of ‘human’
dignity
There is another way in which to interpret Karpowicz et al.’s
human dignity definition, so that it could support a general
critique of the creation of HNH-chimeras with human-like
mental capacities. This interpretation holds that what grants
dignity is the possession of certain psychological capacities.
In this instance, we need to reformulate 1:
(10) Human dignity refers to being worthy or respected
because one is a human that possesses, will possess,
or has possessed functional and emergent psycho-
logical capacities.
(2) Human dignity is based on the recognition that
humans possess, will possess or have possessed
functional and emergent psychological capacities
that indicate they are worthy of respect.
When we reformulate 1 we admit that there are some
humans that do not, and cannot, possess human dignity—
all those human beings that do not possess, will not possess
and have never possessed functional and emergent psy-
chological capacities. It becomes clear that Karpowicz
et al. are embracing a potentiality account of moral worth,8
and thus the number of humans that do not possess dignity
are reduced to those that by means of their congenital
constitution lack the potentiality to develop such psycho-
logical capacities. At this point, let’s specify the mental
capacities that they regard as confering moral worth.
According to Karpowicz et al., human beings’ moral
worth does not only depend on the capacities of reasoning,
choosing freely, and acting for moral reasons [as Kant
(1998) proposes], or entertaining and acting on the basis of
self-chosen purposes [as Gewirth (1982) asserts]. Kar-
powicz et al. (2005, 120) instead assert that what grants
certain humans their unique worth are the previous ca-
pacities plus ‘‘those for engaging in sophisticated forms of
communication and language, participating in interweaving
social relations, developing a secular or religious world-
view, and displaying sympathy and empathy in emotionally
complex ways’’. For them, dignity is a cluster concept
where none of the former capacities by itself is sufficient
for possessing dignity, but when they appear together they
paradigmatically point towards what it is to have dignity.
Now, if we accept that species belonging is a morally
insignificant fact, then we have to accept that species
membership in 10 and 2 should also be regarded as morally
irrelevant. This being the case, we can actually remove this
condition (namely, belonging to the Homo sapiens species)
without any loss. In fact, the definition of human dignity
that these authors provide in their 2005 paper could be
interpreted as pointing in that direction: ‘‘Human dignity is
a widely shared notion that signifies that humans typically
display certain sorts of functional and emergent capacities
that render them uniquely valuable and worthy of respect’’
(Karpowicz et al. 2005, 120).
It is important to note that this definition is not a direct
quote from their 2004 paper, but a new definition that
abandons 1, modifies 2 and specifies the value that human
beings have. In fact, being human is eliminated as a nec-
essary condition for possessing dignity, and thus leaves
open the possibility for other beings to possess dignity. If a
capacities-based interpretation of dignity is warranted then
7 The creation of intraspecific chimeras does not present this
indeterminacy problem.
8 There are different versions of the potentiality account. One of them
is that human beings possess moral worth from the moment of
conception because they have the potential to develop certain
capacities that are not present during the first period of their
development, that are morally worthy.
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their assertion that ‘‘The family of capacities associated
with human dignity seems to belong uniquely to human
beings’’ (Karpowicz et al. 2005, 122) could in fact be
construed as claiming that so far there is no other being
(biological or non-biological) known to humans that pos-
sesses such capacities.9 Their second definition could be
stated, in a species neutral fashion, as follows:
(3) Dignity is a widely shared notion that signifies that
some beings typically display certain sorts of
functional and emergent capacities that render them
uniquely valuable and worthy of respect.
Karpowicz et al. realise that if they adopt a capacities
account of dignity then there are humans that could not be
viewed as possessing it. Confronted with this scenario they
embrace Alan Gewirth’s position when dealing with so
called ‘marginal cases’.10 For Gewirth (1982, 27–28) dignity
is ‘‘a characteristic that belongs permanently and inherently
to every human as such’’. A problem with this strategy is that
Gewirth’s stance is inconsistent with a logical implication of
Karpowicz et al.’s capacities based approach—namely, that
there are humans that do not possess dignity. The authors try
to solve this inconsistency in the following way:
We tend to ascribe it [dignity] to all humans, no
matter how seriously impaired or ill they may be,
because there is no clear agreement about just how
many dignity-associated capacities a person must
possess to be said to have human dignity. To avoid
the possibility of mistakenly failing to treat those
with severe disabilities as ends in themselves, human
dignity proponents ascribe dignity to all humans.
(Karpowicz et al. 2005, 121–122)
This solution can be formulated as:
(4) We ascribe dignity to all humans because there is no
agreed amount of dignity-related capacities one must
possess in order to have dignity, and also to avoid the
mistake of treating seriously impaired or ill humans
as mere means rather than as ends in themselves.
Robert Streiffer has argued that such a solution is not
warranted because there are clear cut cases where a human
being does not possess such morally worthy capacities:
[A]n appeal to uncertainty and disagreement seems
implausible given that there is no real uncertainty or
disagreement that a newborn fails to have the ca-
pacities they cite and so would, on their view, clearly
lack the special moral status that accompanies indi-
viduals with human dignity. (Streiffer 2005, 357)
While I agree with Streiffer that there are clear cut cases
that do warrant such a solution, it must be said that
Karpowicz et al. could claim that there is a problem with
his counterexample: because they assume a potentiality
account, Streiffer’s new born counterexample does not
work in all cases. It does not work because a new born
possesses dignity in so far as she possesses the dignity-
related capacities in a potential state.11
Karpowicz et al. are correct that there are cases where
a ‘prudential’ solution is warranted (e.g. where the
amount of capacities possessed by a being situates her in
a grey area), but there are other cases where it is clearly
not warranted (e.g. when humans, due to a congenital
condition, do not possess the potential to develop such
capacities). Given that there are cases where this solution
is unwarranted (e.g. anencephalic cases), Karpowicz et al.
should abandon it in its present form. If they do not then
they will have to accept that they are proposing an ad hoc
speciesist solution.
Karpowicz et al.’s dignity account can be interpreted in
two ways. The first way has an explanatory gap, and cannot
ground a general argument against the creation of HNH-
chimeras with human-like mental capacities. We should
therefore abandon it. The second interpretation, because it
focuses on capacities and is species neutral, can be used to
construct a general argument against the creation of such
chimeras. Throughout the rest of the paper I will adhere to
the second interpretation, although I will leave out Kar-
powicz et al.’s Gewirth-like solution to the species-over-
lapping cases given that it is not warranted. Now I will
assess the dignity-related arguments that have been pre-
sented against the creation of HNH-chimeras with human-
like mental capacities.
Dignity and HNH-chimeras with human-like
mental capacities
(I) The first argument that Karpowicz et al. (2004, 333)
propose against the creation of HNH-chimeras is that
‘‘Chimeras, by combining the appearance and functional
capacities of humans and animals, seem to risk denying
human dignity’’. The authors assert that the first part of this
9 Karpowicz et al.’s qualifications for possessing dignity are so
stringent (e.g. developing a secular or religious world-view) that no
nonhuman animal appears to have them.
10 The argument from marginal cases, or argument from species
overlap, points out that ‘‘the criteria that are commonly used to
deprive nonhuman animals of moral consideration fail to draw a line
between human beings and other sentient animals, since there are also
humans who fail to satisfy them.’’(Horta 2014, 142) For further
discussion see: (Singer 2001; Horta 2014; Pluhar 2006; Dombrowski
2006; Kaufman 1998).
11 While I will not expand on the subject of potentiality, I must say
that potentiality accounts generally have been found wanting. For a
recent discussion see Stier and Schoene-Seifert (2013).
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argument should be dismissed, because dignity has nothing
to do with the outward appearance of HNH-chimeras or
with the intuitions that such appearances might elicit from
us. The argument, after removing its redundant section,
could be expressed like this:
(5) HNH-chimeras risk denying human dignity by
combining the functional capacities of humans and
nonhuman-animals.
However, we should also eliminate ‘human’, from ‘hu-
man dignity’, so to favour a species neutral dignity
argument:
(50) Chimeras risk denying dignity by combining the
functional capacities of humans and nonhuman
animals.
According to this argument—which is similar to that
advanced by the US National Academy of Science (Na-
tional Academies of Science 2005, 55)—the creation of
HNH-chimeras whose psychological capacities are a
‘combination’ of human and nonhuman ones risks denying
dignity. The first problem with this argument is that it is not
clear which HNH-chimeras risk denying dignity. If it
indicates that all HNH-chimeras—whose psychological
capacities are a combination of human and nonhuman
mental capacities—risk denying dignity (as it seems to
imply), then it is easy to provide a thought experiment that
calls this argument into question. Suppose that a human
person gives her informed consent for her brain to be
grafted with modified elephant neural stem cells, in order
to treat a memory disorder. This action creates a HNH-
chimera that ‘combines’ the functional capacities of hu-
mans and nonhuman-animals. Even so it does not appear to
risk denying dignity, and if it does it is not clear why.
If the authors are instead suggesting that the creation of
‘predominantly’ nonhuman HNH-chimeras—where the
nonhuman animal component belongs to a species that
does not possess human-like psychological capacities—is
what risks denying dignity then they face another problem:
when we create a HNH-chimera that effectively combines
human and nonhuman functional capacities we do not deny
dignity but rather a being with dignity is created. For ex-
ample, if we could engraft enough human neural stem cells
into a pig embryo that it develops human-like mental ca-
pacities, then we would have created a HNH-chimera with
dignity. The creation of this HNH-chimera does not deny
dignity, as before chimerisation the pig embryo does not
possess dignity to be denied.12
(II) The second argument that Karpowicz et al. advance
states that ‘human’ dignity would be undermined by the
transfer of emergent psychological human functions into
research subjects. They claim:
If such a chimera exhibited signs of emergent human
mental capacities, conducting biomedical ex-
periments upon it might be essentially equivalent to
conducting the same experiments on a human person.
Human dignity would be undermined by the transfer
of emergent and supercellular psychological human
functions into research subjects that by consequence
would possess the same capacities themselves.
(Karpowicz et al. 2004, 333–334)
The argument encompasses two elements and can be
expressed as follows:
(6) If a chimera exhibited signs of emergent human
mental capacities, conducting biomedical ex-
periments upon her might be essentially equivalent
to conducting the same experiments on a human that
possessed dignity.
(7) Dignity would be undermined by the transfer of
emergent and supercellular psychological human
functions into research subjects that by consequence
would possess the same capacities themselves.
It is true that if a HNH-chimera possessed the same
mental capacities as a human person, then we should assess
the morality of the procedures carried out upon her as if
they were carried out upon a human person. But it is false
that dignity would be undermined if the recipient of such
capacities was a research subject that by virtue of the
procedure had gained these capacities. If Karpowicz et al.’s
argument is correct then the following case would also
undermine dignity: suppose that scientists engraft normal
human stem cells into a pre-term congenitally anencephalic
child. Imagine that by virtue of this intraspecific chimeri-
sation process this research subject is able to develop,
otherwise unattainable for her, normal human mental ca-
pacities. Now, it is evident that this procedure does not
undermine dignity by means of transferring emergent and
supercellular psychological human functions into a re-
search subject (in this case a human research subject).
Karpowicz et al.’s argument could also be interpreted as
stating that dignity is undermined when dignity-possessing
research subjects are not treated as possessors of dignity, a
claim which is endorsed by de Melo-Martı´n (2008, 338)
and Streiffer (2005, 362–366). It should be noted that if this
is the true sentiment of the argument, then it cannot be
12 It must be clear that even if nobody’s dignity is denied in this case
there can be other welfare considerations that should be taken into
account when making a full ethical assessment of the creation of
HNH-chimeras. For example, a chimerisation process, that is not
Footnote 12 continued
identity affecting, could ‘confer’ dignity to a certain creature while at
the same time it could impose serious bodily harms.
Human dignity and the creation of human–nonhuman chimeras 493
123
advanced as a principled objection against the creation of
HNH-chimeras with human-like mental capacities. Why
not? Because such interpretation disaggregates the ethics
of creating HNH-chimeras with human-like mental ca-
pacities from the ethical evaluation of how research sub-
jects are treated. At best such an argument would reveal
something that everybody accepts, namely that moral
agents should treat other beings according to their moral
status. Greene et al. (2005, 386) have advanced a similar
point in asserting that one option is to not create HNH-
chimeras, and the other option is ‘‘to understand the mental
capacities of engrafted animals and to treat them in a
manner appropriate to their moral status’’. At this point we
can reformulate 7 into 70:
(70) Dignity cannot be undermined by the transfer of
emergent and supercellular psychological human
functions into research subjects that by conse-
quence would possess the same capacities as
human persons, but it can be undermined by the
mistreatment that such subjects might receive from
other moral agents.
(III) Karpowicz et al.’s third argument focuses on the
impact that creating HNH-chimeras with human-like
mental capacities would have on the possibility that hu-
mans could exercise their own dignity-related capacities:
[A]n argument from human dignity would maintain
that to create a human-nonhuman chimera would ei-
ther diminish or wholly eliminate the possibility that
humans could exercise the cluster of capacities and
characteristics that are associated with human digni-
ty, treating them solely as a means to others’ ends.
(Karpowicz et al. 2005, 121)
To state that the mere creation of a being with dignity
diminishes or eliminates the possibility that other humans
(or other beings with dignity) could exercise their dignity-
related capacities is mistaken. If this assertion was true
then it would also be true that every time an extraterrestrial
alien person is born, supposing that there are human-like
intelligent aliens in the universe, her birth would somehow
diminish or eliminate the possibility that humans could
exercise their dignity-related capacities. To assume that
every alien person’s birth leaves all human persons worse
off in this sense is clearly false. The fact that another being
with dignity is created does not affect humans’ ability to
exercise their dignity-related capacities. DeGrazia (2007,
236), along these same lines, has rightly pointed out that if
we coexisted with other hominid non Homo sapiens
borderline, or paradigmatic, persons, their existence would
not diminish or eliminate the possibility that we could
exercise our dignity-related capacities. He provides the
following example: if we were to find a living member of
the Homo floresiensis species this would not diminish or
eliminate the possibility that we, humans, could exercise
our dignity-related capacities.
A more charitable interpretation of this argument could
be offered: we could assume that Karpowicz et al. are not
talking about humans (in ‘‘humans could exercise’’) but
about HNH-chimeras. Even so, the argument remains
problematic. First let’s see a reconstructed version of it:
(8) An argument from dignity would maintain that to
create a human–nonhuman chimera would either
diminish or wholly eliminate the possibility that
human–nonhuman chimeras could exercise the clus-
ter of capacities and characteristics that are associ-
ated with dignity, treating them solely as a means to
others’ ends.
This revised version of the argument is problematic in two
ways. The first problem mirrors that of the ‘uncharitable’
interpretation of it. How could the creation of HNH-chi-
meras with dignity-related capacities by itself cause that
other HNH-chimeras could not exercise their dignity-re-
lated capacities? This seems plainly false. Second, even if
the argument is to be understood as stating that to create a
HNH-chimera would either diminish or wholly eliminate
the possibility that she could exercise her dignity-related
capacities, given that she will be treated solely as a means
to others’ ends, it remains problematic. First, it does not
necessarily follow from the fact that HNH-chimeras with
dignity-associated capacities are created that they would be
treated merely as means towards others’ ends. Here it is
implied, incorrectly, that researchers would be oblivious to,
or negligent of, the HNH-chimeras’ moral status. Secondly,
it is possible, as observed by most commentators, that re-
searchers could overlook the chimera’s moral status but it
does not follow from this possibility that creating HNH-
chimeras with human-like mental capacities would violate
dignity. If this was true then it would also be true that
slaves violate dignity when they intentionally have children
that in turn will be slaves, given that such children are
going to be treated solely as means to others’ ends, and this
is clearly false.
(IV) The fourth argument that Karpowicz et al. advance
is grounded on the degree of functionality of the dignity-
related capacities that HNH-chimeras would possess:
By giving nonhumans some of the physical compo-
nents necessary for development of the capacities
associated with human dignity, and encasing these
components in a nonhuman body where they would
either not be able to function at all or function only to
a highly diminished degree, those who would create
human-nonhuman chimeras would denigrate human
dignity. (Karpowicz et al. 2005, 121)
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There are three problems with this line of argumentation.
First, from a species neutral version of it, the implausible
conclusion that we should not ‘give’ these necessary
physical components (e.g. neural tissues) to certain humans
that are congenitally severely cognitively impaired would
follow. According to the argument, we should not give
such physical components to those congenitally severely
cognitively impaired humans that have bodies where the
components would either not be able to function at all or
function only to a highly diminished degree. This strikes us
as evidently false.
Secondly, given that Karpowicz et al. endorse a func-
tionality threshold for what counts as a denigration of
dignity it would also follow—if we rejected their poten-
tiality account—that we denigrate human dignity when we
restore someone’s dignity-related capacities to a highly
diminished degree. This is an implausible conclusion: we
can easily imagine a case where at time T1 someone pos-
sesses all dignity-related capacities, then at T2 she loses
them all due to an accident or illness, and then at T3 some
of the physical components necessary for the development
of the dignity-related capacities are restored by a doctor
through an intraspecific or interspecific chimerisation pro-
cess. The only caveat is that at T3 the physical components
necessary for the development of such dignity-related ca-
pacities are encased in a body where they would not be able
to function at all or they would only function to a highly
diminished degree. Karpowicz et al. would have to accept
that these ‘restorative’ procedures would denigrate dignity.
This, again, strikes us as false.
The third, and final, problem with this argument is that it
incorrectly assumes that such procedures would diminish or
eliminate the capacities associated with dignity, when en-
casing the physical components necessary for their devel-
opment in a body where they would either not be able to
function at all or function only to a highly diminished de-
gree. ‘‘The creator of the human–nonhuman chimera would
do even worse [than a torturer or enslaver]—he or she
knowingly would diminish or eliminate the very capacities
associated with human dignity’’ (Karpowicz et al. 2005,
121). Now, this is incorrect because prior to the procedure
there are no dignity-related capacities, at least not those that
Karpowicz et al. specify, that could be diminished or
eliminated. As de Melo-Martı´n (2008, 342) points out,
‘‘such capacities cannot be destroyed or diminished unless
there already is a creature with those capacities full present’’.
Contrary to what Karpowicz et al. state, a certain degree of
dignity-related capacities would emerge, but such emer-
gence is dependent on other biological factors (e.g. the body
where the human neural stem cells are transplanted).
(V) The fifth, and final, argument that Karpowicz et al.
advance is a variation of the ‘treatment-argument’ pre-
sented in their 2004 paper. In this new version, they state
that to create a HNH-chimera with dignity-related ca-
pacities would denigrate dignity because the HNH-chimera
would not be able to exercise such capacities due to its role
as a research subject:
To create such a chimera would violate human dignity
because the resulting being could not fully exercise the
dignity-related capacities associated with the human
brain, due to its role as a research subject specifically
produced to serve as a human proxy in experiments that
it would be unethical to undertake on human beings
themselves. (Karpowicz et al. 2005, 123)
This argument is problematic because, as explained
previously, such treatment of a HNH-chimera is not a
necessary feature of its creation. It does not necessarily
follow from the fact that someone is an experimental
subject that she will not be able to exercise their dignity-
related capacities. Secondly, irrespective of the intentions
for which the HNH-chimeras were created, moral agents
have a moral obligation to treat them in accordance with
their moral status. Just as it would be immoral for a re-
searcher to carry out harmful or destructive experiments on
a child created for the purpose of those experiments, it
would be immoral to fail to respect the moral value that
HNH-chimeras possess by means of their capacities.
So far I have tried to show that Karpowicz et al.’s
dignity-related arguments against the creation of specific
HNH-chimeras—those with functional and emergent psy-
chological capacities—fail to prove that in principle their
creation would violate, deny or denigrate dignity. Now I
will turn to examine three arguments that Johnston and
Eliot have advanced against the creation of HNH-chimeras
with human-like mental capacities. Before examining these
authors’ arguments, it must be said that for them the only
HNH-chimeras that risk offending dignity are those that are
compromised (i.e. those that are harmed by virtue of being
a mix of human and nonhuman).
(VI) Johnston and Eliot argue that dignity would be
offended in so far as ‘‘[i]ntentionally creating compromised
human beings or part-human beings is cruel to the creature
created (…)’’13 (Johnston and Eliot 2003, W7). Along the
same lines, MacKellar and Jones have argued that ‘‘Indeed,
it seems that the attempt to create a part human, part
nonhuman being would be wrong to that being’’
(MacKellar and Jones 2012, 176).
I should note that this argument cannot be levelled as a
general argument against the creation of HNH-chimeras
with human-like mental capacities. Why? Because in cre-
ation contexts it is important to take into consideration the
13 Even when presented in Johnston and Eliot’s paper as a ‘‘post-
creation wrongful treatment argument’’, this argument can also be
interpreted as a ‘‘wrongful creation argument’’.
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non-identity problem as identified by Parfit (1984). The
non-identity problem may be interpreted to show that re-
productive choices, or in this case the creation of some
HNH-chimeras, cannot harm the created individual unless
her life is a life not worth living.14 This is so under a
comparative account of harm, and because her only other
‘option’ was never to have been. Cooley (2008, 2) has
made a similar point: ‘‘As long as [HNH-chimeras] have
lives worth living or good lives, one cannot say le-
gitimately neither that their creation and existence injured
them in some way nor that their existence are inherently
bad’’. This being the case, we must reject this argument as
a general argument against the creation of HNH-chimeras
with human-like mental capacities.
(VII) The second argument that Johnston and Eliot ad-
vance maintains that the creation of such chimeras reflects
badly on those creating them and those allowing their
creation:
Intentionally creating compromised human beings or
part-human beings reflects badly [and can be said to
offend dignity] both on those who create the chimera
and on those societies or governments allowing its
creation. What kind of an institutional intention do
we exhibit when we create compromised human be-
ings or part-human beings for our laboratory use?’’
(Johnston and Eliot 2003, W7)
This argument cannot be weighed as a principled objection
against the creation of compromised human beings or part-
human beings (with our without human-like mental
capacities). It cannot be so because the institutional
intentions behind their creation are not necessarily bad or
evil. Even more so, those intentions can be benevolent and
on a par with treating such beings in accordance with their
moral status. For example, the intention behind creating a
‘compromised’ human being, through a chimerisation
procedure, could be to enhance the capacities of a
congenitally severely cognitively disabled human. It is
hard to see how this could offend dignity. Secondly, this
argument, from a species neutral perspective, also entails
that those who intentionally reproduce knowing that they
may create a ‘compromised’ human (a severely ill or
impaired human) would offend dignity and this (except in
wrongful life cases) appears not to be the case.
(VIII) The third, and final, argument that Johnston and
Eliot advance questions society’s role in determining the
moral acceptability of the creation of HNH-chimeras with
human-like mental capacities:
Finally, intentionally creating compromised human
beings or part-human beings might appear to ‘‘all the
world’’ to be using another human, or a part-human, as
a means to an end rather than as an end in itself [and
thus to offend dignity], a use that has been confirmed as
morally unacceptable since at least the Declaration of
Helsinki. (Johnston and Eliot 2003, W7)
This final argument is also unsound: the fact that
something might appear to ‘all the world’ as X does not
mean that it is morally on par with X and should not be
done. Even when it might appear to ‘all the world’ that I
am trying to drown a child when in fact I am trying to save
her, it does not follow that I should stop trying to save her.
Likewise, the fact that ‘all the world’ thinks that a HNH-
chimera will be used solely as a means towards others’
ends does not mean that this is going to be the case. If we
create HNH-chimeras with human-like mental capacities
then we should treat them in accordance with their moral
status. At this point it is safe to claim that Johnston and
Eliot’s arguments are found wanting.
As well as advancing these arguments, Johnston and
Eliot have pointed out that there are two ways of under-
standing human dignity arguments. The first one focuses on
the dignity of individuals (i.e. the dignity of a human)
while the second one focuses on the dignity of a class of
individuals (i.e. humanity’s dignity). According to the au-
thors the second approach may lay the ground for new
criticisms of the creation of HNH-chimeras that possess
human-like psychological capacities (Johnston and Eliot
2003). Alongside this idea, de Melo-Martı´n (2008) has
advanced that previous critics of the dignity-related argu-
ments—namely Franc¸oise Baylis and Andrew Fenton, and
David DeGrazia—have failed to properly identity if Kar-
powicz et al.’s arguments were directed at individuals or at
a class of individuals. According to her, the class-based
counterarguments advanced by Baylis and Fenton, and
DeGrazia are skewed because Karpowicz et al.’s argu-
ments concerned individuals:
[C]ritics and proponents of the human dignity argu-
ment do not have a similar understanding of how
chimera research poses a threat to human dignity.
Thus, although the critics’ arguments might be right,
given that these arguments do not address the par-
ticular way in which proponents believe that human
dignity would be threatened, they cannot conclude that
this threat does not exist. (de Melo-Martı´n 2008, 343)
de Melo-Martı´n then advances two new arguments, from
humanity’s stance, against the creation of HNH-chimeras
with human-like mental capacities.
14 In order for this counterargument to work we need to differentiate
between two types of creation acts: ‘true’ creation acts (e.g. the fusion
of two non-monozygotic early embryos) and creation as modification
acts (e.g. grafting liver human cells into a post natal mouse). ‘True’
creation acts are characterised by the fact that without their
occurrence the created entities would not have existed (i.e. the
numerical identity of the creature depends on chimerisation act).
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(IX) de Melo- Martı´n’s (2008) first argument states that
a threat to humanity’s dignity would occur if scientists
created HNH-chimeras with human-like mental capacities
such that the chimeras were not able to flourish according
to their nature. Even when this appears to be an individual
dignity argument the author considers it otherwise. In order
to show us why this is a humanity’s dignity argument she
asks us to image a scenario where we replaced the HNH-
chimeras for normal human beings:
It is clear, however, that were researchers to use
human beings for experimental purposes, it would be
reasonable to argue that such action would constitute
a threat not just to the dignity of the particular hu-
mans involved, but also to the dignity of human be-
ings as a whole. This would be the case, because all
humans would be diminished by engaging in or
condoning such activities. (de Melo-Martı´n 2008,
339)
This argument is problematic because it assumes that if
all society knew about such practices, and it was clear that
the experimental subject possessed dignity, all of society
would engage in or condone such activities. Contrary to
this assumption, I think that there would be substantial
societal objection and that we would witness a large call to
ban such research. While this is an empirical claim, I think
that similar cases, for example people’s negative reactions
to torture, the experimentation with great apes, and the
hunting of dolphins, show that not all humans would en-
gage in or condone such activities. Therefore, not all hu-
mans can be diminished by engaging in or condoning such
activities because not all humans would engage in or
condone such activities.
(X) The second argument that de Melo-Martı´n advances
is that it is quite unlikely that HNH-chimeras will live in a
context where society will allocate enough resources for
them to flourish and function in accordance with their
higher capacities:
[I]t is highly improbable that society would use re-
sources to ensure that such creatures develop to the
fullest extent of their capacities. Here again, the hu-
man dignity at stake would not be that of the crea-
tures in particular, although their dignity might also
be violated, but that of all human beings. (de Melo-
Martı´n 2008, 339)
If this argument is correct then even without creating
HNH-chimeras humanity’s dignity has be violated. Why?
Because most human societies do not use their resources to
ensure that all individuals within that society (abled and
disabled) develop to the fullest extent their dignity-related
capacities. On many occasions societies are not able to
allocate such resources for reasons such as bad
administration, because the resources available are scarce,
or because they allocate resources to achieve other ends.
For example, think of a hypothetical well-off society that
decided to allocate most of its resources to fight climate
change, and thus prevent an existential catastrophe.
Because of this public schools’ funding is reduced and
students are not able to develop their capacities to their
fullest extent. If de Melo-Martı´n is correct then humanity’s
dignity has been violated in this case, and this appears not
to be the case.
A more charitable interpretation of this argument could
be offered. It could be asserted that society should provide
means for HNH-chimeras to be able to develop their dignity-
related capacities to an adequate extent, otherwise hu-
manity’s dignity would be violated. It is true that if we create
HNH-chimeras with human-like mental capacities then we
have a moral obligation to allocate the adequate resources so
they develop to an adequate extent. It is also true that the
amount of resources dedicated to this task would most
probably depend on local or federal regulations. If this was
the case then, just as in the previous argument, it seems more
accurate to state that only the dignity of those that par-
ticipated in or condoned the allocation of insufficient re-
sources for the chimera to develop to an adequate extent
would be diminished. In this case, we must assert that the
dignity at stake is not that of all human beings.
(XI) The final argument that I will examine has been
advanced by Calum MacKellar and David Jones. In their
book Chimera’s Children, these authors posit that the in-
tentional creation of ‘intermediate’ beings—those that
undermine the biological distinctions between humans and
nonhuman animals (e.g. chimeras or hybrids)—with an
unclear moral status would be the first step in a slippery
slope towards putting into question the dignity of all those
that possess it:
[N]ew beings would begin to exist to whom/which it
would be very difficult to ascertain, with any amount
of certainty, whether or not universal, absolute,
inalienable, and inherent dignity should be conferred.
In addition, if a being were denied the inherent dig-
nity to which he or she was entitled, then the dignity
of every individual in the whole global network, in-
cluding every human being, would be put into ques-
tion. This is because the whole network of persons
(whether or not they are 100 per cent human) would
no longer be consistent, coherent or dependable.
(MacKellar and Jones 2012, 196)
There is one fatal problem with this argument: it does
not follow from the fact that someone’s dignity is denied
(intentionally or accidentally) that the dignity of all dig-
nity-possessing creatures would be put into question. For
example, not even under the most abominable political
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regimes has the dignity of all humans been put into ques-
tion. It is always the dignity of the slave, and not of the
enslaver, that has been questioned. Throughout history
enslavers have managed to construct consistent, coherent
and dependable networks of exclusion without putting
themselves into danger. It is true that some HNH-chimeras’
moral status could be uncertain but in such cases we should
err on the side of caution when dealing with them, not for
humanity’s sake but for their sake.
Final remarks
In this paper I have tried to show that the dignity-based
arguments that have been advanced so far fail to make a
principled case against the creation of HNH-chimeras with
human-like mental capacities. I engaged with arguments by
Karpowicz et al. (2004, 2005), Johnston and Eliot (2003), de
Melo-Martı´n (2008), and MacKellar and Jones (2012), and
found all of them to be problematic. These arguments are
problematic because: (1) they confuse the wrongness of
creating HNH-chimera with the wrongs and harms that
would be imposed upon such HNH-chimeras in certain
contexts; (2) they misrepresent how a being could be treated
solely as means towards others’ ends; (3) they do not provide
a satisfactory account of how the creation of HNH-chimeras
would violate humanity’s dignity; and (4) they disregard the
fact that if such HNH-chimeras had dignity then moral
agents would have the same moral obligations towards those
chimeras as they do towards other beings with dignity (no
matter that the HNH-chimeras were created with the inten-
tion of being research subjects).
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